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Introduction
European Union (EU or Union) law is a source of rights, entitlements, 
authorisations, permissions, duties and obligations for all kinds of 
subjects, including institutions of the European Union, its Member 
States and last, but undoubtedly not least, individuals, legal persons 
and other entities in the Member States1. It is otherwise commonly 
proposed and arguably indisputable that EU law has a direct legal eff ect 
also as regards this latter class. Since it’s not a trivial question to explore 
how EU law actually does this, the primary purpose of this paper is to 
analyse how, at the rudimentary level of legal provisions and rules, it 
is at all possible to assert that any individual has an obligation or duty, 
authorisation or permission; or enjoys a right, benefi t or entitlement, 
that is, in one way or other, rooted in Union law. Since arriving at any 
such result presupposes a certain concept of legal interpretation and 
application of some kind of interpretation methodology, the second 
purpose of this paper is to analyse and demonstrate how, by applying 
certain primary notions of legal situation2 and legal rule3 (in their forms 
developed or accepted by the Poznań school of legal theory), as well 
1 In what follows, the term “individuals” is used to refer to all such national subjects 
in the Member States.
2 On primary and secondary legal situations, see Z. Ziembiński, Logiczne podstawy 
prawoznawstwa, Warszawa 1966, p. 89; S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, Zarys teorii prawa, 
Poznań 2001, p. 100 et seq.
3 Z. Ziembiński, Przepis prawny a norma prawna, “Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny 
i Socjologiczny” 1960, rok XXII, z. 1, p. 105 et seq.
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as certain basic ideas of Maciej Zieliński’s derivative concept of legal 
interpretation along with its methodological framework4, it might be 
possible to clarify and even off er solutions to some puzzling problems 
that EU law, its interpretation and application in the Member States 
has revealed. In what follows and within the limits this publication 
off ers, the focus is on selected areas, recognizing that there is room to 
expand and refi ne both the scope of this analysis and its conclusions. 
A familiarity with the foregoing notions is presupposed, as well as the 
general ideas of the derivative concept of legal interpretation. In par-
ticular, these considerations are based upon a distinction, in all respects 
crucial for that concept, between a legal provision and a legal rule5. 
Finally, legal interpretation is considered an intentional act consisting 
of certain structured actions aimed at answering the following funda-
mental question: What legal rules are expressed by legal provisions? 
Since anyone’s legal situation is asserted by virtue of the legal rules that 
defi ne it, it follows that legal interpretation is a necessary step to defi ne 
any legal situation of any subject.
1. On deontology, legal situations and interpretation
On account of the philosophy of language and social ontology, it appears 
plausible to conclude that EU law is an immediate source of deontic 
powers6 and a source of information on deontic status of a wide variety 
of persons or entities on the one hand, and binding upon a similarly 
broad class of persons and entities on the other. What EU law also 
4 The derivative concept of legal interpretation was anticipated by Z. Ziembiński, 
and developed by M. Zieliński but named by F. Studnicki and T. Gizbert-Studnicki. 
Cf. F. Studnicki, Wprowadzenie do informatyki prawniczej, Warszawa 1978, p. 41; T. Giz-
bert-Studnicki, Wieloznaczność leksykalna w interpretacji prawniczej, Kraków 1978, p. 6–8. 
In its most current shape the concept is set out in: M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa. Zasady, 
reguły, wskazówki, Warszawa 2012.
5 As opposed to legal provisions (understood as a grammatical portion of text in-
cluded in legal acts), legal rules are defi ned as expressions that, in principle, in a general 
and abstract manner and in suffi  ciently clear and unambiguous terms order or prohibit 
addressees of type-S to behave in a manner type-D in circumstances type-C. As such, 
legal rules have a certain form or structure composed of those three elements and a de-
ontic operator: shall – for expressing orders to do something or shall not – for expressing 
prohibition.
6 On the concept of deontic powers, v. J.R. Searle, Making the social world. The structure 
of human civilization, Oxford 2011, passim.
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does – or rather what legal community collectively believe it to do – is 
to immediately defi ne the deontic status of individuals at the national 
level. The above philosophical account is, no doubt, a good starting 
point, yet no legal analysis may be satisfi ed here. For an account must 
also be given of the facts that: lawyers work primarily with legal texts; 
are mainly concerned with legal rules and fi nally, the indispensable 
tools in their professional repertoire are supplied by the accepted nor-
mative concept of legal interpretation, along with the methodology it 
provides. So, what shall one say about this as legal theorist? Granted 
that the founding Treaties and legal acts of the EU7 are composed in 
a specifi c manner and their normative part consists of legal provisions 
grouped into larger text structures, such as titles, chapters, sections, ar-
ticles, and so on8, often written in an ostensibly descriptive manner, all 
the same they perform a specifi c communication and institutional func-
tion which is far from refl ecting on how the world is9. EU acts perform 
and, what appears even more important, are collectively recognized to 
perform a normative function of ordering various subjects to do (not 
to do) something10. Therefore, in terms of legal theory, they defi ne the 
legal situations of those subjects. It follows that at a rudimentary level 
for legal theory, EU acts communicate orders or prohibitions (legal 
rules) that in a certain way relate to individuals at the national level, 
for ultimately, every legal situation is reducible to a legal rule or set of 
such rules that defi ne it.
Thus a proposition that EU law has an immediate or direct legal 
eff ect on individuals in the Member States or at the national level may 
be understood in a seemingly trivial manner as a statement that, in 
one way or other, Union law defi nes the legal situations of those sub-
jects. It may also be asserted that it is by virtue of Union law alone or 
Union law jointly with national laws of the Member States that those 
individuals are obligated to do (not to do) something or that others 
7 For simplicity and clarity, in what follows those acts are jointly referred to as EU acts.
8 On the structure of legal acts of the EU see Manual of precedents for acts established 
within the Council of the European Union, General Secretariat of the Council of the European 
Union, English revision 19 April 2011, p. 3 et seq.
9 However, to a certain extent, they may be used as a source of such information. Cf. 
R. Sarkowicz, Poziomowa interpretacja tekstu prawnego, Kraków 1995, passim.
10 Recognition of that normative function of legal acts is referred to by the derivative 
concept of interpretation as a presupposition of their normativity. Cf. M. Zieliński, op. cit., 
p. 102–107. It seems more plausible to me, though, to talk about ascription of a normative 
function to legal texts rather than presupposition of normativity. 
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have an obligation to do (not to do) something in relation to them. 
Since from the point of view of rudimentary legal theory, any legal 
situation is defi ned by or derived from a legal rule (a consistent set 
of such rules), the author claims and further attempts to  substantiate 
that, as a matter of fact, certain EU acts or their specifi c provisions 
express legal rules (elements of rules) that in various ways determine 
diff erent types of legal situations of individuals in the Member States. 
On account of the derivative concept of legal interpretation, it may 
otherwise be said that there is a normative structure and content that 
underlies, is associated with or assigned to any EU act which diff ers, 
often substantially so, from its prima facie perception. This structure 
and associated content is revealed through legal interpretation per-
formed within a framework of principles, rules and guidelines of in-
terpretation11. Its result may be articulated in the form of a directive 
and thus becomes intersubjectively expressible, while its correctness 
is intersubjectively verifi able.
2. On primary legal situations and interpretation 
of underlying provisions
2.1. From European Union legal acts to legal rules
Legal situations are typically classifi ed into primary and secondary 
legal situations on the one hand and simple and complex situations, 
on the other12. Since complex situations are ultimately reducible to 
a set of primary or secondary situations, this paper focuses on these 
two rudimentary categories. Now, to say that EU law determines, in an 
immediate manner, the primary legal situation of any individual im-
plies that it is possible to generate deontic sentences asserting that by 
virtue of Union law, certain types of behaviours are, for certain types of 
individuals (addressees), in certain types of circumstances mandatory, 
prohibited or indiff erent13. EU law is deemed to defi ne a legal situation 
of obligation in those instances, where it immediately orders (com-
mands or prohibits) a behaviour. Yet not every provision of Union law 
that is intended to induce an individual to do (or not to do) something 
11 For details of that framework see M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 314 et seq. 
12 S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, op. cit., p. 100 et seq.
13 Ibidem, p. 100–102. 
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is directly provided in the form of a legal rule that would moreover be 
suffi  ciently clear as regards its addressee, normative obligation and 
the circumstances in which it actualizes. Thus it becomes a matter of 
legal interpretation, as it is understood by the derivative concept, to 
establish all those normative components (syntactic elements) as well 
as their content and last but not least, express the result so achieved 
(interpretation in the apragmatic sense) in the form of a directive. In 
many respects, interpretation of EU acts poses the exact same prob-
lems as those typically encountered under national law. Nonetheless, 
there arise issues that are specifi c to EU law or the national normative 
environment within which or along with which it is being interpreted. 
Some of those questions may be clarifi ed and possibly even resolved by 
applying the concepts off ered by the derivative concept of interpretation 
and its methodology framework.
2.2. Cross-distribution of rules  in legal provisions
For one part, an inherent challenge accompanying interpretation of EU 
provisions is that they are not always suffi  ciently clear as to whose pri-
mary legal situation is actually being defi ned and in what circumstances 
the obligation actualizes. Certain aspects of this issue have, in fact, been 
the subject of continuous debate dating back to the early stages of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Since identifying the addressees 
of legal rules and their obligations is a primary concern for any lawyer, 
it is worth taking a closer look at how certain provisions of Union law 
may be transformed into the form of a directive: indicating clearly what 
obligations are being imposed, under what conditions and lastly, upon 
whom. In this regard, it should be noticed that many, perhaps most, EU 
provisions are semiotically incomplete in that they do not include all of 
the syntactic and semantic elements that a “fully-fl edged” legal rule is 
supposed to possess. Those elements are usually distributed in diff erent 
parts of legal acts. This, in turn, necessitates a search for the missing 
components as part of interpretation. The derivative concept explains 
that phenomenon by its notion of the syntactic (normative and logical) 
and content distribution of legal rules in diff erent legal provisions14. It 
points to this puzzling feature of legal texts (including EU acts), whereby 
14 M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 108 et seq.
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various elements of the same legal rule, both in terms of its form (syn-
tax) and propositional content (sense), are contained in various legal 
provisions. In other words, the elements of a legal rule – whether con-
sidered from a purely formal or semantic point of view – are fragmented 
in diff erent parts of the same or even multiple legal acts. Nonetheless, 
during interpretation all those fragments must be considered as a whole.
On account of the derivative concept, it is always (and rightly so) the 
framework provision that is a starting point for any act of interpretation15. 
Framework provisions contain at minimum the element of behaviour 
accompanied by a deontic operator (shall/shall not) and, as a result, 
seem best placed to serve as a building block for the entire normative 
structure. For this reason, normative incompleteness of interpreted pro-
visions may only concern the element of addressee, circumstances or both 
these components. Provisions that contribute any missing elements to 
the framework provisions – whether normative or logical – play a syn-
tactically completing role (completing provisions)16, while those that 
modify its actual content – a modifying role (modifying provisions)17. 
For these reasons, interpretation of any EU act should commence with 
the identifi cation of a framework provision, followed by the insertion of 
any missing syntactic elements or elements modifying its sense based 
on other relevant legal provisions. It may prove a relatively easy task 
to locate any missing parts of a legal rule in the same or any related 
EU act. What is to be said, however, about those cases, where a EU 
provision, imposing obligations upon individuals or in relation to them, 
lacks a key element that simply cannot be supplemented by means of 
any other EU act? Certainly, the problem may not be left unsolved and 
it frequently transpires that in the quest for the right answer one may 
need to refer to national law. Prime examples of such syntactically in-
complete EU provisions may be encountered in the procedural or private 
international laws that do not or only rarely set out any addressee for 
the legal rules they encode18. Those addressees are typically defi ned 
15 Ibidem, p. 188–201.
16 Ibidem, p. 188 et seq.
17 Ibidem, p. 215–225.
18 E.g. the missing addressees for the rules encoded in Rome I regulation (Regulation 
(EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations, OJ L 177, 4 VII 2008, p. 6–16) should be 
completed based on the Polish Code of Civil Procedure (unifi ed text J.L. 2014, item 101, 
as amended) and the Law on structure and organisation of common courts (unifi ed 
text J.L. 2015, item 133).
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by the institutional and procedural laws of the Member States. This 
particular type of distribution (whether syntactic or content-related) 
can be referred to as cross-distribution. Although founded on the notion 
designed by the derivative concept, it underscores the fact that the 
elements of rules are distributed amongst legal acts enacted by institu-
tionally independent legislators. Nevertheless, thanks to the derivative 
concept, there is no need to explain this phenomenon from scratch and 
develop new methodologies to deal with those hard cases. Instead, it 
is possible to rely on the conceptualisations and methodology already 
designed by that concept. Needless to say, a correct identifi cation of 
the missing components of such cross-distributed rules may prove 
particularly diffi  cult.
2.3. Plurality of European Union legal provisions
Another important and common reason why EU law may not always 
be clear as regards the addressees of legal rules it encodes is because 
the very same legal provision may be intended to defi ne primary legal 
situations of entirely diff erent categories of subjects. What is striking is 
that the members of those classes belong to entirely diff erent norma-
tive ontologies or legal orders. Despite the doctrine of direct eff ect19, it 
continues to be puzzling that the very same provision contained, as an 
example, in the founding Treaty may impose obligations and thus defi ne 
the primary legal situations of both Member States in their state capacity 
(as understood by public international law) and various individuals at 
the country level. The concept of direct eff ect appears to provide an 
important yet partial explanation to that puzzle. Failing to account for 
the striking diff erence between the literal sentence-meaning and the 
normative or pragmatic sense of those provisions, the doctrine of di-
rect eff ect seems to leave out certain crucial aspects, off ering no formal 
analysis of the phenomenon in question. 
Consider the following provision20:
19 This is widely known and as such does not need to be explained here. Readers may 
fi nd a comprehensive yet concise summary in: T.C. Hartley, The foundations of European 
Union Law, Oxford 2010, p. 209 et seq. 
20 Art. 157 TFEU, ex. Art. 119 EEC.
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(1) Each  Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for 
male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is 
applied.
Its literal meaning is clear and precise in that this provision defi nes a pri-
mary legal situation (obligation) of the Member States. From a theoreti-
cal point of view, it expresses a program rule that binds its addressee as 
to the result (objective), while leaving it to the Member States to defi ne 
and undertake the necessary measures to achieve it. It seems that the 
normative structure underlying such provisions may be expressed by 
the following form:
(2) Membe r State MS shall take measures M necessary to achieve ob-
jective O by time T at the latest21.
Therefore, interpretation of those provisions should account for the 
above structure. It is important to notice that behaviours ordered by 
program rules (which are contained not only in the founding Treaties, 
but also directives) consist of two distinct, yet functionally correlated 
components (M+O): taking the necessary measures (M) and the actual 
objective that the same target to achieve (O). In principle, the content 
of M may be reconstructed based on Art. 4 para. 3 Treaty on Europe-
an Union (TEU) and Art. 291 para. 1 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) that express instrumental rules obligating 
the Member States to carry out all actions that are necessary to ensure 
fulfi lment of their obligations and achievement of EU objectives (includ-
ing implementation of EU acts), as well as refrain from any actions that 
would make the same impossible. As far as directives are concerned, the 
content of M is specifi cally set forth in the fi nal provisions concerned 
with the implementation of directives and typically consists of bringing 
into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions22. 
Regardless of its clear and unambiguous meaning, the provision in 
example 2 is attributed yet another deontic power: the power to defi ne 
21 In what follows, the letters MS, M, O, and T are used respectively for: “Member State;” 
“measures;” “objective of the program rule;” and “time”.
22 Cf. Joint Practical Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
for persons involved in the drafting of European Union legislation (JPG), p. 43, http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/content/pdf/techleg/joint-practical-guide-2013-en.pdf (accessed: 15 V 2015).
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the primary legal situations of individuals23. In other words, it is deemed 
to impose obligations upon the addressees that are not even remotely 
mentioned in its literal content. As a matter of fact, this puzzle is part 
of a much bigger question: How is it possible that certain categories of 
EU provisions that prima facie bind the Member States may also bind 
a variety of other persons or entities at the national level? To an extent 
not yet accounted for by the doctrine of direct eff ect, the derivative 
concept appears to off er a possible answer by providing the conceptu-
alisation and apparatus necessary to explain their underlying structure. 
Above all, such provisions are considered by the derivative concept as 
plural24. The notion of plurality assumes that certain legal provisions 
express more than one legal rule or, in the majority of cases, elements 
of more than one legal rule. In other words, diff erent legal rules (their 
elements) are, as the derivative concept explains, condensed in the 
very same text25. 
The plurality of certain legal provisions may be immediately evident, 
whereas without an in-depth analysis it may be escaping us in other 
instances. Last but not least, one might be confronted with a hard case 
of plurality by defi nition26. The latter covers all cases where the plural 
nature of a provision may not be discovered by a mere linguistic anal-
ysis of its syntax and content, but requires substantial legal knowledge. 
This is precisely the case as regards Art. 157 TFEU in example 1. It is 
deemed to impose obligations and thus defi ne primary legal situations 
of: (i) Members States (EU level) – which follows immediately from its 
sentence-meaning and is refl ected by the formal structure in example 2; 
(ii) individuals (national level) – which doesn’t follow from the actual 
text at all, but results from the extra-linguistic rules developed by the 
doctrine and case law (see example 3 below). As a result, this particular 
provision in Art. 157 TFEU may be further described as plural in view of 
its addressee. The derivative concept appears to provide the methodol-
ogy framework detailing how, in general terms, such plural provisions 
ought to be dealt with. Above all, they should be separated into dis-
tinct normative structures and thereafter the interpretation of each and 
23 Cf. Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 8 IV 1976, Defrenne v Sabena, 
C-43/75, ECR 1976, p. 455.
24 M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 135 et seq. 
25 Ibidem, p. 134 et seq.
26 Ibidem, p. 137.
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every one of them should be carried out separately27. As regards EU law 
specifi cally, this procedure reveals an interesting pattern as far as the 
element of behaviour is concerned enabling the formulation of a specifi c 
interpretation rule. While the Member States are obligated to do what 
is refl ected by the structure type M+O, typical of program rules, it is 
certainly no longer the case as far as obligations of any individuals are 
concerned. They are bound to do what is symbolized by O. Therefore, 
interpretation of such plural provisions should yield two legal rules: 
one rule refl ected in example (2) and yet another rule refl ected by the 
following simplifi ed structure: 
(3) Addre ssee S shall do DO in circumstances C28.
As clarifi ed under ECJ case law, in order for any EU provision to be plural 
and generate normative structures type 3, it must meet the conditions 
as set out under the Van Gend test29. Based on the analysis carried out 
from the point of view of the derivative concept, the Van Gend test ulti-
mately appears reducible to the following set of requirements: (i) it is 
possible to identify the element of addressee in clear and precise terms 
based on the provision under interpretation or its context; (ii) DO de-
notes or is reducible to a clear and precise behaviour of addressees; 
(iii) it is possible to identify the circumstances in which the obligation 
denoted by DO actualizes; (iv) that obligation is not dependent on any 
further actions as mandated by Union law to be performed by either 
the Member States or the EU itself. Consequently, the structure type 3 
excludes the following scenario a limine, and any provisions that lead 
to that scenario may not be considered as producing a direct eff ect: 
“If Member State MS or the EU takes the measures M, then addressee S 
shall do DO in circumstances C”.
As regards the addressees of the rule type 3, it must be possible 
to identify them based on the content or context of the provision in 
27 Ibidem, p. 325 et seq.
28 In what follows, the letters, S, D, DO, and C are used respectively for: “addressee 
who is a national of a MS;” “ordered behaviour/act/action;” “ordered behaviour/act/
action corresponding to the objective of the program rule;” and “circumstances”. As a side 
remark, the obligations of individuals may, in certain cases, be phrased as prohibitions 
(e.g. prohibition of discrimination).
29 Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 5 II 1963, Van Gend & Loos, C-26/62, 
ECR 1963, p. 1.
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question. Frequently, this will be decided on the basis of the actual 
content of DO, such as in example 1, where the result to be achieved 
may easily be attributed to employers. Consequently, the actual legal 
rule could be expressed in the following terms: 
(4) Each employer shall apply the principle of equal pay for male and 
female workers for equal work or work of equal value.
The assignment of obligations upon diff erent categories of addressees 
is also dependent on the type of act which contains the provisions 
under interpretation. In general, the Founding treaties, international 
agreements and regulations30 may defi ne primary situations of any 
person or entity, including the Member States, EU institutions, but also 
both private and public persons or other entities at the national level. 
The same conclusion extends to certain categories of decisions whose 
scope of application is abstract and general31. The situation is radically 
diff erent, though, as regards directives and, yet again, certain types of 
decisions which, from the point of view of individuals, resemble di-
rectives. It is important to notice that directives, by defi nition, enact or 
should enact program rules. They set out results (objectives), leaving 
it to the national authorities to select the form and methods necessary 
to achieve them. Directives are addressed to the Member States and, as 
such, may not defi ne primary legal situations of any person or entity at 
the national level. It is common knowledge that this general principle 
has a major exception, which includes the state (most broadly under-
stood), regardless of whether it is: (i) acting in the capacity of the State 
Treasury or through its “emanations;” or (ii) exercising public authority. 
As for directives, structures type 3 hold solely as long as the addressees 
fall under this broad category of the state.
It is still under debate, how to give a proper account of legal provi-
sions with Member States as their addressees at the EU level that some-
how “change” to have a diff erent “actual addressee” at the national level. 
In particular where the directive in question has not been implemented 
on time. Various solutions have been put forward, but none of them 
30 Under their legal defi nition regulations are acts that have general application, are 
binding in their entirety and directly applicable in the Member States (Art. 288 TFEU)
31 This paper is not concerned with the decisions understood as individual instances 
of the application of the law. 
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yields a suffi  cient or entirely plausible explanation32. First, the idea of the 
“actual” addressee may not suffi  ce, as it simply leaves out a signifi cant 
portion of deontology: Member States always remain the addressees 
of directives. Advocating a “change” in the element of addressee doesn’t 
appear plausible, either, for it is diffi  cult (if not impossible) to explain 
what this “change” actually is, let alone account for its “mechanics”. The 
author of this paper argues that a possible solution to one aspect of this 
puzzle has already been presented above and is based on the notion of 
the plurality of legal provisions as conceptualised under the derivative 
concept of interpretation. It seems more convenient and closer to lin-
guistic intuition to assume that certain provisions of directives, by intent 
and ab initio (with no need for any “change”), express the elements of 
more than one legal rule. From the content point of view, they actually 
communicate much more than their literal sentence-meaning appears 
to express prima vista. On this account, the provisions in question con-
tain the elements of: (i) a legal rule addressed to the Member States 
(rule R1); and (ii) yet another rule addressed to a specifi c category of 
national subjects acting on behalf of the state or considered to be its 
emanation at the national level (rule R2). As demonstrated above, this 
problem is not limited to the element of addressee alone. It also impacts 
that of behaviour and possibly the accompanying deontic operator (shall/
shall not). Under rule R2 (no longer a program rule), its addressees are 
ordered to perform a specifi c type of act or action or otherwise behave 
in a clearly identifi ed way, without which no EU provision could pro-
duce any direct eff ect.
The solution to the remaining part of this puzzle concerns the ele-
ment of circumstances. It follows from the very nature of the Treaties and 
regulations that the obligations they impose, except as otherwise stated, 
do not require any further action on the part of either the Member States 
or the EU. They are unconditional and directly applicable. The same 
does not hold true for directives and “directive-like” decisions which, 
by defi nition, require implementation in the national legal order. Their 
direct applicability is associated with a Member State’s default in the 
implementation. Hence, the structure of rule R2 in this analysis could 
be formalised as follows:
32 For more on this topic and possible solutions see S. Prechal, Directives in EC law, 
Oxford 2005, p. 55 et seq.; B. Kurcz, Komentarz do art. 288 Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii 
Europejskiej, in: Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej. Komentarz, t. 3, red. A. Wróbel, 
Warszawa 2012. 
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(5)  If a Member State MS fails to implement directive DR by time T at 
the latest or fails to do so correctly, then addressee S shall do DO 
in circumstances C.
These considerations lead to a more general conclusion that the directly 
applicable provisions of directives have, in fact, an entirely diff erent 
normative structure refl ected in example 5, to those contained in the 
Treaties or regulations and expressed in example 3. As part of inter-
pretation, those seemingly subtle diff erences must be brought into 
full view and, as demonstrated in this analysis, the derivative concept 
of interpretation provides both an excellent conceptual apparatus to 
articulate these issues and the methodology to deal with them.
3. On secondary and complex legal situations 
and interpretation 
3.1. Secondary legal situations in general
EU law defi nes the deontic status of individuals in yet another way: by 
defi ning their secondary legal situations. A secondary situation of an in-
dividual under a legal rule (benefi ciary, authorised subject) derives from 
a primary legal situation of yet another subject as the addressee of that 
same rule33. Thus one and the same rule imposes an obligation upon its 
addressee, which is simultaneously correlated with a deontic power at-
tributed to its benefi ciary (authorised subject). Although secondary legal 
situations or deontic powers associated with them are typically labelled as 
“rights,” this category is neither uniform nor structurally identical. On the 
classical theoretical account, secondary situations may be classifi ed into 
two major categories of entitlement and authorisation (competence)34. 
There is also the question of sanctions that appear to be complex legal 
situations, whose propositional content always involves a negative impact 
on a subject. In that specifi c sense they are a convert of entitlement. Due 
to its complexity, this category shall be discussed separately. 
33 S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, op. cit., p. 100.
34 Based on the criterion of an actualized “right,” one ought to discriminate sub-
stantive claims as a class of actualized entitlements from procedural claims as a class 
of procedural rights to bring an action before the national courts, tribunals or other 
authorities of the Member States to protect a substantive right.
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The lack of understanding and discrimination between diff erent cat-
egories of legal situations and the underlying rules may, and often does 
lead, to confusion. It is further aggravated by the convoluted way EU acts 
can be expressing legal rules. As a matter of fact, the fi rst landmark cases 
before the ECJ, such as Van Gend or Costa35, concerned the very question 
if the Treaties and regulations encode the legal rules that defi ne only 
the primary legal situations of the Member States and institutions of the 
EU, or if they also express the secondary legal situations of individuals 
(their entitlements, authorisations or possibly both).
3.2. Entitlements of individuals under European Union law
Secondary legal situations of entitlement arise for individuals fi rst-
ly, because EU law directly imposes obligations on certain subjects 
that are, in one way or other, favourable to those individuals as their 
benefi ciaries, and secondly, because the entitlement to that benefi t is 
recognised under both the EU and national legal orders. Thus the nor-
mative structure of the rules expressing entitlement may be refl ected 
as follows: 
(6)  Addressee S shall do D for the benefi t of benefi ciary B in circum-
stances C.
Entitlements involve deontic powers vested in their benefi ciaries au-
thorising them to demand the benefi t from the addressee, as long as 
that benefi t is inherent or otherwise immediately follows from the ob-
ligations imposed. Hence, entitlements are linked with authorisations 
(as described in more detail below) inuring to the benefi t of benefi ciar-
ies empowering them to seek enforcement of that benefi t before the 
courts of the Member States36. At the same time, this authorisation also 
defi nes the primary legal situation of the courts, which are obligated to 
recognise the case brought before them and adjudicate. Thus complex 
35 Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 15 VII 1964, Costa v. E.N.E.L., C-6/64, 
ECR 1964, p. 585.
36 Cf. Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 5 II 1963, Van Gend & Loos, 
C-26/62, ECR 1963, p. 1: “It follows from the foregoing considerations that […] article 12 
must be interpreted as producing direct eff ects and creating individual rights which national 
courts must protect”.
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legal situations arise37. From a structural perspective they are defi ned 
by a set of functionally correlated legal rules, whose syntactic and se-
mantic elements are, in fact, cross-distributed, as EU law provides very 
few procedural provisions. As a result, the procedural rules protecting 
individual rights granted under Union law are primarily reconstructed 
based on national laws. Yet their components always include an element 
of entitlement stemming from EU law. 
A special category of EU entitlements inuring to the benefi t of in-
dividuals includes freedoms from state interference. In the context of 
Union law, such freedoms are defi ned by the legal rules addressed to 
the national authorities and are typically encountered in the area of the 
internal market and its fundamental freedoms. Benefi ciaries of those 
rules are free to act in a certain way, e.g. by selling goods from one Mem-
ber State to another without having to pay any customs duties (Art. 28 
para. 1 TFEU). The structure of those rules may be outlined as follows:
(7)  Member State MS shall not do anything that may prevent or interfere 
with benefi ciary B doing D in circumstances C.
It seems that one of the key interpretation challenges relating to EU 
law consists in the correct determination of whether a given normative 
obligation has any benefi ciary associated with it and who that benefi -
ciary is. In principle, any clear and unconditional prohibition imposed 
upon the Member States, which can technically be transformed into 
a benefi ciary-type normative structure as set out in example 7, with an 
identifi able benefi ciary, should be deemed to defi ne a legal situation 
of freedom. Nonetheless, the subtleties related to directives and direc-
tive-type decisions (before their implementation deadline) must be 
noted. Obviously, the situation diff ers if the benefi t is attempted to 
be sought against any private person, for no obligation may arise under 
directives for any private individuals. Entitlements may be expressed in 
a form substantially similar to examples 6 and 7, yet they may also be 
articulated from the point of view of the benefi ciary, who “may,” “can” 
or “is entitled to something”. Interpretation challenges concerning those 
legal provisions are diff erent, as the focus shifts in precisely the opposite 
direction. Instead of searching for a benefi ciary, one is searching for the 
addressee bound to provide the benefi t.
37 S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, op. cit., p. 106 et seq.
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3.3. Individual competence (authorisation) under 
European Union law
Secondary legal situations may also arise for individuals in those cas-
es where EU law directly authorises them, as competent subjects, to 
perform an institutional act, whereby an obligation either actualises 
or is created for an addressee38. While all rules of competence ascribe 
deontic powers to authorised subjects, so that they are empowered to 
bind others through their own acts, authorisations in the latter form are 
simultaneously correlated with a special ontological power. 
Authorisations are defi ned by the rules of competence (authorisa-
tion rules)39 and, in a simplifi ed form, their syntax may be outlined as 
follows: 
(8)  Addressee S shall do D if an authorised subject A performs an in-
stitutional act C.
The structure of authorisation underscores the fact that the acts per-
formed by authorised subjects fall under the element of circumstances 
in which an obligation is either created or triggered. In EU acts, the 
rules of competence are typically formulated from the point of view of 
those empowered to create obligations binding upon others or even 
themselves simply by performing an institutional act. Thus a formal 
transformation of those expressions into the structure of a directive may 
appear diffi  cult and in a sense counter-intuitive. This may be justifi ed 
by psychology and a typical way of thinking about law perceived not 
only as a source of obligations, but equally or even more importantly 
as granting and safeguarding one’s rights. It appears to be taken for 
granted that there is always someone against whom one’s rights may 
be enforced. In a certain sense it shouldn’t matter whether someone’s 
obligation is syntactically expressed from the point of view of an autho-
rised subject (a benefi ciary in the case of entitlement) or an addressee 
actually bound by the correlated obligation. Those structures should, 
paraphrasing the principle of identity, be mutually substitutable salva 
intentione legislatoris. Yet for purposes of legal interpretation, it may be 
38 Ibidem, p. 104.
39 For the rules of competence in the Polish literature see Z. Ziembiński, Kompetencja 
i norma kompetencyjna, “Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 1969, rok XXXI, 
z. 4, p. 23 et seq.
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argued that the transformation into the normative structure, as set out 
in example 8, is required or at least recommended in order to identify, 
beyond any reasonable doubt, the subjects bound to react to an insti-
tutional act. One may be surprised how very often such identifi cation 
is not as straightforward as one would hope. 
Consider the following provision in the UCC40: “The customs authori-
ties may carry out any customs controls they deem necessary”. This provision 
encodes a legal rule that, on the one hand, defi nes the secondary legal 
situation of customs authorities (competence), while simultaneously 
creating a primary legal situation for someone who is “endowed” with 
a “privilege” to bear through the customs control. It is neither clear 
who it is nor in which circumstances such control may be carried out, 
but it may be suggested that no-one would question the importance of 
addressing those questions.
3.4. Complex legal situations
The focus shall now be turned to the question of complex legal situa-
tions. By necessity, this account will be limited to certain aspects of that 
issue and shall focus on how selected types of those situations may be 
expressed by EU provisions and what their interpretation entails. 
It is commonplace for the same legal provision to defi ne a primary 
legal situation of certain addressees and simultaneously determine 
their secondary situation of competence. A typical example includes 
those provisions obligating the authorities to perform an institutional 
act. Consider the following provision41:
The customs authorities shall release the guarantee immediately when the 
customs debt or liability for other charges is extinguished or can no longer arise.
It defi nes at least three legal situations: (i) the primary situation of 
customs authorities by obligating them to release the guarantee; 
(ii) the secondary situation of the very same authorities authorising 
them to perform the act of releasing the guarantee; and lastly, (iii) 
the secondary situation of the subject who issued the guarantee in 
40 Cf. Art. 44 para. 1 of the Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code, O.J. L 269 
of 10 X 2013, p. 1–101, hereinafter “UCC”.
41 Cf. Art. 98 para. 1 of the UCC. 
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the fi rst place (as the benefi ciary of the obligation imposed on the 
authorities). On account of the derivative concept of interpretation, 
this provision is plural by intent, as it expresses the elements of at 
least two legal rules: 
(a) Rule RO imposing an obligation upon the customs authorities as its 
addressee S, in the form outlined in example 6, that has a benefi ciary 
(B) associated with that obligation.
(b)  Competence rule RC, in the form outlined in example 8, which has 
the same subject as both its addressee S and authorised subject A.
As a matter of fact, similar yet even more complex legal situations arise 
under the provisions encoding sanctioning rules (their elements). Under 
competence rule RC, the addressee S (person subjected to the sanction) 
is always distinct from the authorised subject A empowered to apply the 
sanction. In addition, the normative obligation in rule RO is of a diff er-
ent kind because, by defi nition, the prescribed behaviour is expected 
to bring about certain negative consequences for the person subjected 
to the sanction. For one part, such rules impose an obligation upon the 
authorities to apply the sanction against the person subjected to it and 
at the same time they empower the authorities to do so. Furthermore, 
sanctioning rules create obligations binding upon persons subjected 
to the sanction, which may consist in tolerating certain acts of the au-
thorities considered as a nuisance or requiring them to do something 
unpleasant, such as pay a fi ne or penalty. Since only rarely does EU law 
stipulate any sanctions, leaving it rather to the Member States to do so, 
sanctioning rules provide an excellent example of the cross-distribution 
of rules in legal provisions enacted by institutionally diff erent legisla-
tors42. As such, sanctioning rules provide a useful demonstration of the 
syntactical complexities that legal interpretation in today’s multi-level 
legal environment entails.
It follows from this legislative practice that the structure of a typical 
rule which sanctions a violation of EU law consists primarily of the ele-
ments enacted under national laws, save for the element of circumstances 
that includes a reference to the sanctioned rule:
42 A typical example of how sanctions are dealt with under EU law may be found 
in Art. 42 para. 1 of the UCC: “Each Member State shall provide for penalties for failure 
to comply with the customs legislation. Such penalties shall be eff ective, proportionate 
and dissuasive”.
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(3)  If addressee S violates sanctioned rule of EU law RU and the com-
petent authority A imposes sanction D upon addressee S, then ad-
dressee S shall do D.
It is important to notice that the element of circumstances consist of 
a iunctim of two components: (i) violation of the sanctioned rule by 
its addressee who is also the addressee of the sanctioning rule; and 
(ii) imposition of the sanction upon that addressee by the competent 
authorities. Examples of sanctioning rules illustrated in example 9 may 
be encountered in the FCC43, which abounds in blanket rules. Interpreta-
tion of those provisions requires the incomplete element of circumstances 
to be completed based on the provisions enacted by EU law.
3.5. Interpretation of complex legal provisions
Interpretation of EU provisions that defi ne complex legal situations 
should commence with their separation into distinct normative struc-
tures, accompanied by the proper articulation of behaviours ordered by 
each rule. On many occasions this exercise is nontrivial and may require 
an in-depth understanding of both the legislative practice and rules of 
interpretation accepted by the legal community. The guiding principles 
on how to perform those syntactical operations constitute a key element 
of the derivative concept of interpretation. Those principles appear 
adequate and apply to the same or an even higher degree to interpre-
tation of Union law, considering its genuine complexities and syntactic 
and semantic relations with national laws. The derivative concept may 
be applied successfully here and arguably developed further, taking 
into account EU legislative practice. For example, positive commands 
(imposing obligations) are typically expressed by the modal verb shall44, 
while prohibitions take the negative form of “may”45. Nonetheless, there 
are many diff erent and not evident ways in which EU provisions express 
prohibitions, such as in the below example46:
43 Law of 10 IX 1999 – Fiscal Criminal Code (J.L. 2013, item 186), hereinafter “FCC”.
44 For more information see European Commission Directorate-General for Transla-
tion, English Style Guide, A handbook for authors and translators in the European Commission, 
August 2011, p. 42, last updated on April 2015, hereinafter “ESG”. 
45 Ibidem.
46 Cf. Art. 7 para. 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 V 2000 on in-
solvency proceedings (OJ L 160, 30 VI 2000, p. 1, as amended).
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The opening of insolvency proceedings against the seller of an asset, after de-
livery of the asset, shall not constitute grounds for rescinding or terminating 
the sale […].
Here, the prohibition is expressed indirectly by stating that something 
shall not constitute grounds for something else. This simply means 
that the addressee (a contracting party) shall not terminate or rescind 
an asset sale contract after delivery of the asset on the grounds that the 
insolvency proceedings have been opened against the seller. Those 
non-evident ways of expressing obligations or prohibitions in EU law 
could form the basis for developing new principles of interpretation. 
But even as far as “may” is concerned, one should be careful in at-
tributing any meaning to it too quickly. For it is used in EU law for 
many purposes, such as expressing competence. Furthermore, it can be 
a mark for modifying provisions which stipulate exceptions either from 
the scope of application of a rule (if modifi cation relates to the element 
of addressee or circumstances) or its scope of regulation (if modifi cation 
applies to the element of behaviour). Modifi cations include: (i) positive 
permissions, where they exclude certain categories of objects or sub-
jects from a prohibition; or (ii) negative permissions, where they permit 
certain subjects not to do something or not do something in relation 
to some objects47.
Conclusions
In conclusion, several remarks may be made regarding the considera-
tions presented in this paper. Secondary legal situations in relation to 
Union law may, in principle, arise for individuals pursuant to the legal 
rules that impose obligations and thus defi ne the primary situations 
of: (i) the state and its emanations as set out in example 5 (vertical 
eff ect); (ii) institutions of the EU48; (iii) private individuals (horizontal 
eff ect); (iv) more than one of the foregoing categories of subjects. For 
the purposes of interpreting Union law, it is crucial to understand that, 
in principle, any sources of EU law, ranging from the Treaties, through 
international agreements and ending with secondary sources, may de-
fi ne the secondary legal situations of individuals. Thus as part of inter-
47 Cf. ESG, p. 43.
48 Cf. Art. 267 TFEU which defi nes a secondary legal situation of national courts and 
tribunals by virtue of a legal rule binding upon the ECJ.
Studia Prawa Publicznego 2015-10 - 2 kor.indd   54 2016-01-18   09:38:43
55On legal situa  ons and the interpreta  on of European Union law
pretation involving EU provisions, it is generally possible to reconstruct 
rules that have individuals as their benefi ciaries or authorised subjects. 
The same applies to complex legal situations that consist of entitle-
ments and authorisations, regardless of whether they are classifi ed 
as individual rights or not. By contrast, not every act may be a source 
of primary legal situations for private individuals (e.g. directives and 
decisions resembling directives), and by the same token, no secondary 
situations will arise for any person or entity based on such acts if a ben-
efi t or obligation were to be requested from or enforced against private 
individuals. The same principle applies to any legal situation of sanction 
against individuals, for no sanctions may arise against them based on 
the provisions contained in directives (decisions resembling directives).
EU law defi nes various legal situations of diff erent categories of sub-
jects, including nationals in the Member States. The reason why it is at 
all possible for EU law to do this is because its provisions express legal 
rules (their elements) which designate such nationals as their address-
ees, benefi ciaries, authorized or sanctioned subjects. Those rules are 
reconstructed during the interpretation of Union law. Both the apparatus 
and methodology framework designed under M. Zieliński’s derivative 
concept of interpretation, as demonstrated in these considerations, may 
be directly and successfully applied to that end. As it transpires, this 
concept proves even more helpful in those cases where diff erent syntac-
tic and semantic elements of legal rules are distributed in the legal acts 
enacted by institutionally independent legislators (cross-distribution). 
Furthermore, the notion of the plurality of legal provisions developed 
under that concept provides an explanation and contributes to solving 
some puzzling questions that EU law has presented one with, including 
the problem of multiple and implied addressees of legal rules.
O SYTUACJACH PRAWNYCH I WYKŁADNI PRAWA UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Prawo unijne stanowi źródło praw, uprawnień, kompetencji, obowiązków i zobo-
wiązań różnych podmiotów: instytucji unijnych, państw członkowskich oraz pod-
miotów krajowych. Ponieważ eksplikacja, w jaki sposób prawo unijne to w istocie 
czyni, nie jest wcale sprawą trywialną, podstawowym celem artykułu jest ustalenie, 
na rudymentarnym poziomie przepisów i norm prawnych, jak to się dzieje, że 
podmiotom krajowym przysługiwać mogą prawa i obowiązki w jakiś sposób zako-
rzenione w prawie unijnym. Jako że udzielenie odpowiedzi na to pytanie zakłada 
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akceptację pewnej koncepcji wykładni prawa, drugim celem opracowania jest 
wykazanie, że derywacyjna koncepcja wykładni prawa prof. Macieja Zielińskiego 
umożliwia eksplikację, a nawet rozwiązanie niektórych problemów ujawniających 
się w ramach wykładni i stosowania prawa unijnego w państwach członkowskich. 
Przeprowadzona analiza normatywna wybranych przepisów wykazuje, że prawo 
unijne wyznacza w istocie pierwotne, pochodne i złożone sytuacje prawne pod-
miotów krajowych. Przepisy unijne wysłowiają bowiem normy (elementy norm), 
które czynią podmioty krajowe ich adresatami, benefi cjentami lub podmiotami 
uprawnionymi. W artykule wykazano, że zarówno konceptualizacje, jak i metodo-
logia koncepcji derywacyjnej mogą być z powodzeniem wykorzystane w procesie 
rekonstrukcji norm prawnych w ramach wykładni prawa unijnego. Koncepcja ta 
okazuje się przydatna zwłaszcza wówczas, gdy elementy syntaktyczne i semantycz-
ne rekonstruowanej normy są rozczłonkowane krzyżowo między aktami prawnymi 
ustanowionymi przez instytucjonalnie różnych prawodawców. Okazuje się również, 
że wypracowane w koncepcji derywacyjnej pojęcie pluralności przepisów przyczy-
nia się do rozwiązania interesujących problemów dotyczących prawa unijnego, jak 
problem wielości i założonych adresatów norm.
Słowa kluczowe: derywacyjna koncepcja wykładni – prawo Unii Europejskiej – 
wykładnia prawa UE – interpretacja prawa – sytuacje prawne
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